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I. ECONOHIC DEVELOPMENT Ai.~D FERTILITY 
I.l Introduction 
There has been a growing body of literature in recent years on 
the impact of economic development on demographic variables, particularly 
fertility. This coincides with, and no doubt has basically resulted 
from, a worldwide revival of interest in questions centering around the 
"population issue," Unpreced.anted p~pula.tion increases in the under­
developed countries since the end of World War II have posed a serious 
threat to economic growth~ uncennining the somewhat accelerated but still 
relatively modest gains in output in these countries. This, combined 
with the oa!:~.ries made by enviromnentalists in the industrial countries, 
is causing a great de~l of global concern. A growing number of govern­
ments have adopted a.nti--nata.listi.c policies and launched ambitious 
family-planning progra.ms ~ and aid-giving cocntries and international 
agencies have been generous ia providing funds to support these national 
programso 
The body of thought on the relationship between economic development 
and fertility has developed along two lines which on the surface seem to 
be opposite to each other, One of these approaches is basically Malthusian, 
predicting a pc.,sitive ~.,_onel1:ttion between economic development and fertil­
ity. Halthus belie.·,;eci. that ar:y improvement in the living levels of 
the labor class would encourage marriages in general and early marriages 
in particular. This, coupled with increased marital fertility due to 
better diet and living conditions, would result in higher birth and pop~ 
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ulation growth rates in the society as a whole, However, critics of 
Malthus have suggested that the incre&sed growth rates of population in 
the late 18th century in England were a reflection of only a rapid de­
cline in mortality rates and that fertility was not affected at all by 
the Industrial Revolution, We do not have sufficient evidence to sub­
stantiate either contention in terms of whether or not fertility rates 
actually increased in the late 18th and early 19th century in Western 
Europe, but it would be entirely possible for a society to realize 
a transitory increase in fertility as a result of a rapid decline of 
mortality. Fertility would be encouraged because declining mortality 
would result in more marriages lasting through the childbearing ages, 
Needless to say, our interest concerning the impact of economic 
growth on fertility is what happens not in a relatively short and trans• 
itional period but rather in the long run. Here, those who postulate 
an inverse relationship between economic de•..relopment and fertility 
appear to have more convincing arguments in their arsenal. This approach, 
known as the demographic transition model, views demographic change in 
basically three stages. At first there is a long period of near-balance 
between birth and death rates (historically when they were a little over 
thirty per thousand in all societies). This is evidenced by the fact 
that it took the world population seventeen centuries to increase from 
roughly 300 million around year one, to roughly 600 million. There was 
a primitive equilibrium between man and resources; when the balance 
seemed to be upset on account of excess births, death rates increased, 
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restoring the equilibrium. 
During the second phase, death rates gradually decline as a result 
of improvements in living levels, health conditions and medical knowledge, 
while birth rates remain stable. Host of Western Europe went through 
this phase of demographic change during the later part of the 18th and 
most of the 19th century. The European population more than doubled in less 
than one century. 
The third stage of the demographic transition is reached when birth 
rates also become subject to control and begin to decline gradually 
until a new balance between the birth and death rates is restored at 
a relatively low level; somewhere around fifteen per thousand (with 
death rates being slightly lower than birth rates). This is what hap­
pened in Europe beginning in the late 19th and r:iost of the 20th century. 
The proponents of the transition theory sugg2st that the demographic 
history of the now industrialized countries could be expected to repeat 
itself in the present-day underdeveloped countries. Although present 
population growth rates in these countries are at alarmingly high levels 
of around 2.6 percent per annum, what we observe now is claimed to be 
the second phase of demographic transition, i.e. death rates becoming 
subject to control but birth rates remaining stable. Eventually, they 
claim, internal pressures similar to those that helped lower birth 
rates in industrialized countries will go into action and pull down the 
birth rates. 
The alarmists on the "population explosion" in the developing world 
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take little comfort from this theory. Firstly, they point to the speed 
at which population is currently growing. At present rates, the pop­
ulation in the underdeveloped countries will double itself nearly every 
twenty-five years, compared to the one hundred years that it took the 
European population to double itself in the second phase of the trans­
ition. Secondly, they maintain that external factors such as imported 
'highly successful' Western medical practices have been the cause of the 
sudden fall in the death rates of these countries since the end of World 
w~r TT ~nrl nnr t-ht=i. r,h::n,ging sccic-eccncn1ic conditions as \Vas the case in 
the European countries. As a result, the expectation of a decline in 
fertility to follow the fall in death rates may not be very realistic, 
at least in the short run. 
Keeping in mind the European pattern of demogr2pilic change and what 
is happening in the underdeveloped countries, let us pursue the question 
of the interrelationship between economic and democraphic changes. 
Economic development is often associated, and correctly so, not 
only with annual increases in total or per capita output but also with 
changes in a number of other socio-economic variables. This latter as­
pect of development is usually called structural change or is loosely 
defined as modernization. There is usually a continuous increase in 
the level of literacy in general, and in female literacy in particular, 
associated with an improvement in the status of women in the society. 
The composition of the labor force changes in favor of non-agricultural 
sectors. Actually the so-called industrialization process is considered 
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to be taking place once the share of the agricultural labor is at sixty 
percent or less and is declining continuously.
1 
Also migration from 
the rural part of the country to the .cities gains momentum. 
In this modernization process, institutional changes also take 
place; some are the products of deliberate government policy and some 
are the byproducts of development itself. The economy becomes more 
monetized as agricultural production becomesmore market-oriented. Saving 
and banking institutions develop. Usually governments assume a crucial 
role in promoting development, generally through the implementation 
of development programs. Government's share in the use of total product 
increases visibly and the government becomes instrumental in the mobil-
ization of domestic r2sources. Labor becones better organized, social 
security and old age pensions programs go into effect, and child labor 
may become less ~)revalent. Changes may also take ?lace in the use and 
distribution of agricultural land. 
Meanwhile on the demographic scene, as indicated earlier, mortality 
rates, including infant mortality, start falling. Life expectancy at 
birth goes up dramatically. This is generally a response to the combined 
effects of improvements in nutrition, rudimentary hygiene, public health 
and sanitation. 
This process, basically as described above, has been observed in a 
1 simon Kuznets, !!Present Underdeveloped Countries and Past GrowthPatterns," Readings in Economic Development, edited by Johnson andKamerachen, (Cincirmati: Southwestern Publishing Company, 1972), p. 39. 
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majority of underdeveloy,ed countries. Available statistics indicate 
an average yearly growth rate in output of approximately five percent 
in underdeveloped countries during the last two decades. Even though 
the average population growth rates of 2.6 percent allowed only for an 
overall per capita incooe growth of a little more than 2 percent, this 
was still higher than the recorded rates in earlier decades. The structures 
of the economies were also going through changes. In most countries the 
share of non-agricultural output increased impressively. There have also 
been efforts in investing in all types of infrastructure .facilities. En-
rollments in all levels of schools increased and health conditions improved. 
During these last two decades most countries made attempts, through plan-
ning, to change the socio-economic structure, and tc install neF institu-
tions that are expected to be conducive to development. Implementation· 
usually falls short of the targets bu.t this should not cover up the fact 
that some ground has been gained in the fight against poverty. 
There have also been dramatic changes in mortality rates and life ex­
pectancy at birth in underdeveloped countries. Death rates dropped to 
below 20 per thousand while the expectation of life rose on the average, 1 
to fifty-five years. Life expectancy in these countries is now higher 
than the levels prevailing in Western Europe at the turn of the century. 
1
H. J. Habakkuk, Population Growth and Economic Developr.1en t
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1971), p. 257. 
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However, save a few exceptions, there has not been an:-r empirically 
observed downward trend in fertility rates in the vast majority of under­
developed countries. Fertility levels have declined ouly slir:htly in a few 
Latin American and Asian countries, and:, some studies even indicate an 
increase in crude birth rates in some Latin American countries 
since 1945. 1 
Thus, there is no clear-cut empirical evidence--in fact not even 
any crude observation--concerning any discernable impact of recent 
economic deve:i.opment on the birth rates in underdeveloped countries. 
Expected declines in fertility are yet to be seen while the consequences 
of rapid population growth in these countries remain a najor concern for 
the international community. In-depth ::ount:ry studies could shed light 
on the relationship between changes in development variables and demo­
graphic variables, despite the usual serious lack of data. The present 
study attempts to evaluate the experience of Turkey in the last 
thirty years. Before the Turkish case is analyzed, however, it seems 
advisable to advance,within the framework of a formal model, hypothesized 
relationships, first between the individual indicators of economic development 
on the · one hand anc. fertility on the other, and second, between the 
combined effect of the development variables and fertility. Evidence 
from other studies will also be briefly reviewed. 
1
For exarnple, see Andrew Collver, Birth Rates in :;:_,a tin Ameriea:New Estimates of Historical '.i:rends and -f-_;l,...u_c_t_u_a_t_i_o_,n_s_.-...,R=-e___s_e_a_r_c_,.h--,S=-e-r....,.ies No. 7
(Berkeley: University of California, 1965). 
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I.2 Interrelaticns 0e::ween Fertility :nd DLovelopmer.t variables 
Eac:..1 of the development variables has either an independent and/or 
an instrumental impact on the fertility behavior of a population. The 
independent: impact is the direct effect (positive or negative) of a 
change in a development variable on fertility. The instrumental impact 
of a given variable is its indirect effect on fertility via its relation 
with another development v:1riable. In the following we will examine the 
probable impact of each of the important development variables on fertil-
ity. 
Income: It is difficult to separate the independent impact of income from 
its instrumental i::ipact since income is very highly correL::.tec1 with most 
of the othe:~ modernication variables. Leibenstein was one of the first 
to explore the relationship between income and fertility •
1 
He identifies 
three types of utility accruing to parents from having child::cen: first, 
a child being a "con.sumption good," second, a "productive agent" and 
third, a "potential source of security." He maintains that there is a 
negative correlation between the level of income and the utility derived 
from children as productive agents and potential sources of security. 
However, he feels that the relationship between the income level and the 
satisfaction from having children is indeterminate. He also points out 
that the cost of having children, both in ten:is of "conventional expenses" 
and "opportunities foregone," increases as the faI!lily income increases. 
e,_oenst:ein,·· . - an •conomJ..c. rowtt1.l,,r1.. L · E•conom1.c· back"waraness.,., ' d E G 
John t-Jile:/ & Sen, 1957), p. 161. 
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Becker suggests that the demand theory for consumer durables1 is 
applicable to the analysis of the demand for children, since children 
provide "utility" as consumer durables. He maintains that since children 
are not inferior goods, the demand theory tells us that the demand for 
children should increase as income goes up. However, at higher 
income levels, families may also demand "higher quality11 children, imply­
ing not that the children are superior goods but that more money is 
spent on them. Thus Becker thinks that Leibenstein is mistaken when 
he suggests that the cost of children goes up as the family's income in­
creases. Rather, an increase in expenditure on children should indicate 
that the parents prefer higher quality children. 
In a more recent study, Jasterlin added a neF element by suggesting 
that "permanent incomen is r.1ore pertinent to household decision-making 
than "observed income" at a given time. 2 Given the permanent income, which 
in effect means che potential income of a family, what determines the 
demand for children is the "structure of preferences" resar<ling goods, 
chilc.ren, leisure and fertility control practices. Easterlin suggests 
that besides permanent income and the structure of preferences, the third 
1Gary S. Becker, "An Economic Analysis of Fertility," in Demographic
and Economic Change in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1960), pp. 209-231. 
2Richard A. Easterlin, "Toward a Socio-econo;nic Theory of Fertility:
A Survey of Recent Research on Economic Factors in American Fertility, 11 
Fertility and Family Planning: A World View, edited by S. 3. Behrman, 
et. al., (Ann Arbor: Tbe. University of Hichigan, 1970), pp. 12i-156. 
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relevant factor is various "price constraints," such as the prices of 
child care and of different fertility control methods relative to the 
prices of goods in general. 
These pioneering works on the theory of fertility behavior have 
also stimulated empirical investigation of the relationship between 
income and fertility. D. Freedman found that potential or expected in~· 
1come had more influence on fertility than did current income .. R. Freed•· 
man and Coombs concluded that in.come increases might encourage the demand 
for children, but with higher economic status, "other reasons" for no~~ 
having children also become important. 2 Blake attempted to show that as 
the money income irrcreased, so did the 11 :i.ndirect costs" as well as the 
"direct costs" of raising children, cancelling the positive effect of 
·1· 3income on f erti ity. 
These studies were based on data from developed countries. Tho3•:-
who attempted to investigate the relationship bet.ween income and fe.:c::i:_J· 
ity in underdeveloped countries had to face more serious data shottcomi.ngs 
Detailed family income statistics are needed in order to measure 
partial impact of income on fertility with some accuracy. Among the few 
studies covering underdeveloped countries, Adelman found that the pardal 
1Deborah s. Freedman, "The Relation of Economic Status to Fertili-::y," 
American Economic Review, LIII, 3, June 196 3, pp. 414-426. 
2Ronald Freedman and Lolagene Coombs, rrEconomic Considerations in 
Family Growth Decisions,:: Population Studies, XX, 2, November 1966, p. 2ll. 
') 
.)Judith Blake, "Income and Reproduction Motivation," Popula::ion 
Studies, XXI, No. 3, November 1967, pp. 185-206. 
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effect of income on fe:::-tility was consistently positive for all age 
1groups in a cross section analysi.s of thirty-seven countries. A similar 
conclusion was reached by Weintraub based on a study of thirty countries.
2 
The findings of these studies give support to the view that in­
creased income may encourage fertility. 3 However, the instrumental impact 
of income increases may be quite different. Higher levels of income are 
usually closely associated with other moden1ization variables such as 
education which clearly have depressing effects on fertility. Simon, 
after analyzing the results of some of the aforementioned studies, main-
tains that the "unconditional effect'1 of income on fertility is negative 
in underdeveloped countries, even thouGh its partial effect may be positive. 4 
The historical experience of the industrialized countries also supports 
the view that the overall impact of. income on fertil:i.ty is neeative. 
1 
rrma Adelman, "An Econometric .\na.lysis 0£ Population Growth," American 
Economic Review, LIII, No. 3~ June 1963, pp. 3llf-339. 
2
Robert Weintraub, "The Birth Rate ar:.d Economic Development: An 
Fmpirical Study," Econometrica,Vol. 30, No. 4, October 1962, pp. 812-817. 
3
Heer reported that in a study covering 318 localities in 18 Latin 
American countries, he and E. s. Turner found out that the areas with higher 
than expected fertility were clustered in nations which had experienced a 
relatively high rate of growth. (David H, Heer, "Economic Development and 
Fertility," Demography, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1966, p. 426). In a cross section 
study of sixty-seven provinces in Turkey in 1965, one of the authors of 
this study found no sir,nificant partial iu:pact of income on fertility. 
B. Tuncer, "A Study of the Sccio-Lconomic Determinants of Fertility in 
Turkey," Economic Growth Cente-::.- Discussion Papers No. 121,. Yale University, 
1971. 
u - · ue. + 1 Pop
4J 11.an· L. Simon, Tl'Tt:. -fi:;_:tect- o ... -l.ncc,me on F•erti· ity, " ulation. 
Studies, Vol. XXIII, Ho • .3, Hovember J.969, pp. 327-341. 
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Education~ The d.cc;pressing affect of education on fertility has long been 
established. Education :Ls expected to have both sizeable independent 
and instrumental effects. Above all, education helps people to be more 
conscious of their surroundings and frees them from traditions. 
One way edl.ication may adversely effect fertility is that it provides 
opportunities, particularly for women, that conflict with child-bearing 
and child-rearing. Women with education have a greater opportunity to 
be gainfully employed outs:'~de the home. Since education also provides 
more economic independence for women and since the proportion of young 
adults attending schools increases as education spreads, the average age 
at first marriage ~sually goes up. There is also a strong association 
between the educational attainment of parents and the cost of child-rearing. 
Even if one agrees with Becker (and many do not) that the cost of children 
is the same for everybody, it is also true that educated couples will tend 
to opt for higher quality and not quantity of children. 
Also literacy and education obviously help people to learn 
how to avoid unwanted pregnancies through the increased flow of informa­
tion. This is particularly true in underdeveloped countries. In ad­
vanced countries where the literacy level is around 90 percent, more 
education may not be very significant as far as knowledge of birth control 
is concerned. However, in underdeveloped countries where illiteracy is 
at very high levels, lack of contraceptive knowledge can be a factor con­
tributing to high fertility and can result in a significant difference 
between the number of c:iildren couples actually have and the number they 
would prefer to have" Easterlin suggests that education,by widening hor-
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izons,may raise aspirations for material goods and lower the relative 
desire for children, thus raising the subjective costs of unwanted 
pregnancies. On the other hand, by directly affecting knowledge of 
contraceptive technique,education lowers the cost of contraception and 
works for a reduction in unwanted pregnancies. In suggesting this, 
Easterlin argues that couples,in considering the use of fertility control 
methods,weigh the loss of utility attached to the possibility of an un­
wanted birth against the loss of utility attached to the cost of con-
. h ' 1traceptive met oas. 
There is sufficient empirical evidence showing the negative nature 
of the relationship between education and fertility. Adelman found that 
in all the child-bearing age groups the regression coefficients of 
birth rates with respect to education were negative. Quantitat::tyely 
among all the independent variables, education exerted the largest absolute 
i nfluence upon f erti·1·ity. 2 Hughes reported the same strong negative 
correlation between fertility and education. 3 Dandekar also reached 
similar conclusions in a study based on data for forty-nine underdeveloped 
countries. 
4 
In the same study, he mentioned that a national sample sur­
vey in India found that approximately only sixty percent of illiterate 
1
Easterlin, op.~., pp. 136-138.
2
Adelman, op.cit., n. 322.
3
R. E. Hughes~Hum~n Fertility Differentials: The Influence of
Industrial Urban Development on Birth Rates," Population Review, July 1959,
p. 62.
4
K" Dandekar, "Effect of Education on Fertility, 11 in United Nations,
Proceedings of the World Population Conference 1965, Vol. IV (New York,
1967) ~ p. 149. 
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married couples knew about contraception. The ratio jumped to seventy­
eight percent for primary school graduates and to ninety-six percent 
for university graduates. 
The Turkish Demographic Survey also gives supporting evidence to 
the above conclusions. Birth rates varied considerably among women with 
different levels of schooling. Within the most fertile age group of 
20-24, birth rates varied from 305 per thousand among illiterate women, 
to 235 for primary school graduates, and to 113 for middle school gradu-
ates. 1 In another Turkish study, Timur found that on the average, 
illiterate women had 4.2 children, literate women without formal education, 
3.2, women with primary school education, 2. 8, women with secondary 
education, 2.0 and women with university education only 1. 4. 2 
In the cross-section study of Turkey mentioned above, one of the 
authors also found a strong negative relationship between a nunber of 
education variables and fertility in Turkey. In the regression equa-
tions, more than sixty-five percent of the variance in fertility was 
explained by education alone and the remaining independent factors com-
bined explained only fifteen percent. And the female primary school 
graduate variable was stronger than both the general literacy variable 
. 3
and the male primary school graduate variable. 
1
school of Public Health, Turkish Demographic Survey 1966-67,
Ankara University, 1970. 
2s. Timur, "Socio-Economic Determinants of Differential Fertility
in Turkey," Institute of Population Studies, Hacettepe University,
Ankara 1971, pp. 11, 14 (mimeo). 
3
Tuncer, op.cit., p. 32-3. 
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Urbanization: Urbanization is another variable that generally attracts 
attention in studies of fertility behavior. Data from a large number 
of countries indicate that urban fertility rates are lower than rural 
ones. For example, the Turkish Demographic Survey shows that the total 
fertility rate for urban localities with a population of more than 2000 
was 3.88 while it was 6.12 for rural areas in the survey period of 1966-67. 
Even though the figures given for rural and urban settlements are 
widely disparate, interpretation of them warrants caution. It is an es­
tablished fact that city dwellers are usually economically better off, 
better educated, and have better provisions of social services. Thus 
it is difficult but important to separate and identify the i.~dependent 
impact of urbanization on fertility. However, one could expect urban­
ization to have a depressing effect on fertility for independent reasons 
alone. For one thing, the urban setting provides more economic oppor­
tunity and social freedom for women. This should discourage both early 
marriages and frequent pregnancies. It has also been argued that there 
exists a significant cost differential in child-rearing between rural 
and urban areas. Having more children in rural areas does not add to 
the space requirements and to the various expenditures in the same 
proportion as it does in the cities. Also, children are usually more 
valuable as productive agents in rural areas where they help as farm 
labor from an early age. 
Industrialization: The potential impact of industrialization on fertility 
is also complicated. Historically, income or output growth, urbanization 
and industrialization all took place at the same time and thus it is 
hard to separate the independent impact of industrialization on fertil­
ity. Nevertheless, the industrialization process as defined either in 
terms of the increasing share of non-agricultural value added within an 
increasing total output, or the redistribution of labor force in favor 
of non-agricultural sectors, is expected to have both independent and 
instrumental values in depressing fertility. Industrialization in­
creases income levels, improves standards of living, facilitates educa­
tion and training, influences the family norms and encourages small 
nuclear families, exposes the labor force to modern technology, encour­
ages urbanization, expedites legislation for old age pension and social 
security plans. These. factors combined are bound to influence attitudes, 
help the masses break away from tradition, and thus favor lower birth 
rates. Furthermore, industrialization is often accompanied by in­
creased female labor force participation in areas where it had been 
low by tradition, a factor that should further discourage early marriages 
and large families. 
General Hortality and Infant Hortality: Economic development helps to 
bring about a decline in mortality, including infant mortality. Increased 
incomes enable people to have better nutrition, more adequate shelter 
and improved sanitation. Governments are more capable of fighting 
famines and epidemics, and they can provide better public health services. 
Improvements in other development variables, education in particular, 
also contribute to lowering the death rates. 
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We have already indicated that the general declines in mortality 
in the recent experience of underdeveloped countries were more attri­
butable to improvements in medical conditions than to overall improve~ 
ments in living levels including nutrition. However, regardless of the 
cause of the decline in mortality, such a development should have a 
significant impact on fertility trends, though perhaps with a time leg. 
First of all, decreasing infant and child mortality put pressure 
on families and the society as a whole in the direction of lowering 
fertility. If fertility remains constant as child mortality declines, 
the average size of families increases sharply and supporting a family 
becomes more costly. This should serve as a stimulus to reduce fertil­
ity. 
Secondly, couples usually have some notion about the number of child­
ren they would like to have. Given a high level of infant and child 
mortality,women tend to bear more children than actually desired with 
This is even morethe expectation of losing some of them at early ages. 
obvious in countries where great importance is attached to having a 
surviving son. Once child mortality declines, the number of surviving 
children approaches the number of births. This should also help to 
reduce fertility. 
The third relevant factor is of a biological nature. Lactation 
reduces the probability of conception~ and in societies where extended 
breast feeding is prevalent, any improvement in infant mortality should 
act as a birth control device--however unreliable it is--and thus reduce 
- 18 -
pregnancies. 
On the other hand declines in adult mortality may have a different 
impact on fertility, particularly in the short run. As the adult 
mortality goes down, mor:e marriages last through the reproductive years 
of women, thus increasing the probable number of children couples have. 
A number of institutiom:l factors mentioned above that depress fer­
tility need not be elaborated here,. In a developing economy, develop­
ment of an old-age pension sd:eme, a social security system, laws 
limiting child 18.bo-r, and similar institutional changes should further 
eliminate the need and the desire for a large number of children. 
In view of the foregoing, we hypothesize that the overall long term 
impact of social and ~conomic development on fertility is negative. Nost 
of the modernization variables associated with economic development 
are expected to have a depressing effect on fertility. However, since 
declining fertility also involves changes in the attitudes and traditions 
of the society, this expected impact may be delayed. This lagged effect 
is probably stronger for variables like urbanization and industrializa­
tion. Meanwhile, it is even conceivable that in the short run the posi­
tive impact of increased income, improved health conditions and lower 
adult mortality may outweigh the negative impact of other variables. 
It should also be emphasized that the relationship between economic 
development and fertility is not unidirectional. Changing fertility also 
influences the social and economic variables individually as well as the 
economic development process as a whole. However, the examination of the 
impact of fertility on eco-::iomic development is beyond the scope of this (Jtudy. 
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II. DES2::GH OF THE STUDY 
Both the desien of the study and the selection of variables have 
been understandably influenced by the availability of data. It was 
difficult and sometimes impossible to find information for some of the 
variables that were thought to be of importance in this study. For 
other variables, data were not available for the whole period under 
consideration. The intention was to go as far back as possible in time 
in order to investieate the influence of a lar3e nunber of develop­
ment variables on the fertility pattern. However, t;1e data prior to 
1935 are more scarce and less reliable than those for the period 
after 1935. The:::efore the presen:: study covers the period from 1935 
to 1965. 
The unit of observation in this study is rrprovince. 11 A province is 
the primary unit of administration a21d represents a relatively hornogen­
ous populace" It is 2lso used as the primary area unit of reporting 
in the quinquernial Turkish censuses. Presently there are sixty-seven 
provinces in Turkey. ·within the p•~riod under study, however, a 
number of administrative boundary adjustments were made. In the 1940, 
1945 and 1950 censuses e1ere were only sixty-two provinces. In 1955 
the number increased to sixty-six, and in 1960 to sixty-seven,without 
any change in the national boundaries. In sor.1.e cases,a province was 
divided into two, but in most cases, the creation of ne~, provinces in­
volved boundary changes in more than one province. In order to assure 
the consistency and homo,ceneity of the observations, two operations were 
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performed: the number of provinces was reduced to sixty-two, and 
appropriate adjustments were made for population changes in the provinces 
with boundary changes. 
Since the present study is designed to explore the impact of a 
number of development variables on fertility, the selection of an 
appropriate and reliable measure of the provincial fertility level for 
the entire period under consideration is essential. Turkey, like many 
other underdeveloped countries, does not have a long and continuous 
tradition of vital registration. Even now t:1ere are no official 
estimates of provincial births and deaths. Fortunately, the quinquennial 
censuses have regularly reported provincial po?ulations by age,and 
it was possible to construct provincial crude birth rates (CBR), using 
'reverse projection technique 9 , though a great deal of data adjustment 
was involved. By definition, CBR is the total nur,~ber of live births 
per thousand of total population during a snecified period of time, 
usually a year. here, .the estil:,ates for provinc.ial C:i3:i,zv s refer to an 
average of a ten-year period and co7er 1935-45, 1940-50, 1945-55, 1950-60, 
and 1955-65. 1
 A detailed explanation of the methodology used in the 
1rt may be interestin3 to mention that we also tried "child-woman 
ratio" as a measure of provincial fertility levels; for one reason, it 
involved a much smaller degree of data adjust1:ient than did CBR. However, 
a historical series of provincial child-women ratios 3ives an obviously 
erratic pattern of fertility due to, amonG other reasons, serious age 
misreporting of both children and women, and wide regional differences 
in child as well as adult mortality. 
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estimation of provincial CBR :is given in Appendix A. 
It should imr:1ediately be noted that the esti:nates r;iven here are 
not intended to be precise and exact estimates of the CBR is the pro­
vinces. The data are ina.c1.equate to make such a claim. Nevertheless 
the authors are convinced that the CBR estimates are reasonable approx­
imations of the actuals and that they realistically reflect inter­
provincial differentials in fertility. 
Data constraints also influenced the selection of independent 
variables. Ideally all the de.velopment variables discussed in the pre­
vious section shoul-:i be included, ilut time series data for such vital 
variables as income a:c.d chilc'. mortali~y are not available for any con­
tinuous length of time, However; there is a strong correlation between 
income and some of tl:.e :·_::eluded. variables. For example the correlation 
coefficient between tbe level of income aaC: fem.ale literacy is D.66 for 
1965 (the only year £or ~-,hich provincial income estimates are available), 
between income and urbanization it is O. 79, and between income and 'the 
proportion of male workers in tJ.1e industry sector; it is O. 91. As a 
result the availability of these variables enabled us to gauge the in­
direct effects of inccme differentials. 
The main source of information for the independent variables used 
in this study was <=J.::.so the Turkish quenq uennial censuses. Despite the 
uniformity of the source. ~')roblems -;-,ere encountered in the construction 
of time series for different variables selected because of differences 
resulting from coverage and/or definiticns in different census years. In 
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the following, we will describe the independent variables selected for 
this study and the more important assumptions and adjustments made in 
the construction of their time series. 
Literacy Level: Literacy is selected here as the education variable 
since data do not exist for different levels of schooling for the entire 
period. A person is enumerated as literate if he or she knows both 
how to read and how to write. The literacy level is measured as the 
percentage of total population reported literate, separately for males, 
females and both sexes. 
The 1960 literacy f~gures required major adjustments. For the 
majority of provinces these figures were considerably lower than those 
for the preceding and follouing census year. The 1960 figures are 
replaced by a simple average of the 1955, 1960 and 1965 census figures, 
which give a very plausible trend. 
Industrial Composition of Labor Force: The industrial distribution of the 
male labor fnrrP i c: 11i:;11R.l1y 11c:Pn ro inrli r,::ir,=, c:t-·..-,,,..t-11r,::il ,..h,::ingP.:: in Prnn-
omic activity, as well as tc show the pace of the industrialization process. 
1We have used here Kuznets' classification scheme, and regrouped 
different industrial categories into three major sectors, namely "agri­
culture," "industry" (including mining, manufacturing, construction, gas, 
electricity and water, transportation activities) and "services" (includ­
ing trade and general services). 
1s · J.mon ., •· octern- E · ,.., ' ,ate, structure an sJ.\.Uznets, ·· 1 conomic ,__,.rowt,1: R d pread 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 86-87. 
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The relevant variables are the pe:::centages of male workers fifteen 
years and over respectively in these three major sectors. Uniform pro­
vincial data exist for the industrial distribution of male workers 
fifteen years and over for the 1955, 1960 and 1965 census years. How­
ever, the 1950 census reported only the occupational distribution and 
included workers between the ages of 5 and 14 years. The 1945 census, 
though reporting industrial distribution, did not take any minimum age 
limit. Fortunately, for both years detailed age distributions of 
the population and labor force for the whole country were reported and 
it was possible to exclude workers Delow age fifteen. By probing into 
the occupation by industry matrices for Turkey and r.,aking other relevant 
assumptions, it was possible to approxi:,1ate the distribution of male 
workers into the three sectors from the 1950 provincial occupation 
distr ibutions. 
Fem.ale Non-agriculture Labor i1orce l'articiuation: This is measured as 
the percentage of women fifteen years and over engaged in non-agricultural 
activities. The reason for not including women engaged in agriculture 
is that a preliminary examination of th2 female labor force statistics 
revealed a sharp continuous decline in the extent of female participation 
in agriculture over time. This Kas undoubtedly due to the uneven coverage 
in the different census years. In the earlier years practically all the 
women living in villages were enumerated as agricultural workers whereas 
in the later years only those who specified their occupation as agricul­
tural work were re?orted as participat~ng in economic activity. 
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Urbanization: Urbanization is measured as the percentage of total 
population living in urban areas. Five different levels of urbaniza­
tion are taken, namely percentages of the total population livin8 in 
urban localities of 2,000 and over, 5,000 and over, 10,000 and over, 
20,000 and over, and 50,000 and over. 
Marital Rate: The marital rate obviously may not be categorized with 
the development variables discussed earlier. However, there are some 
important considerations which seem to warrant the inclusion of a marriage 
variable. First, the continuing influences of religion and associated 
moral values in Turkish society does not allow any extrar:iarital fertility, 
i.e., ceteris paribus, t:-1.:.re is a direct relationship bet,,1een marital and 
fertility levels, Secondl:T, Tu:::-key nas al,;rnys :.1ad the tradition of uni­
versality of marr~~age, At ::my given time; then, the primary factor 
influencing the aggreeate marital rate is the 'a8e at marriage.' It is 
easy to see that given a relatively low ave:~a[;e age at marriage, such as 
exists in many pre-modern t,ocieties, the ar;gregate maritaJ. rate will be 
high, and vice versa. In turn, age at marriage, particu.larly when it is 
very low, is known to be significantly affected by social and economic 
advancemento Here the relevant question is to what extent the differences 
in birth rates are attributable to the differences in marital rates. 
The marital rate is calculated as the percentage of women fifteen years 
and over, narried FemalE: :narital rate is preferred over male or total 
marital rate as, in tne absence of, official marriage records, uomen are 
more likely to report a marriage ":han are men. ).lso, in the case of men 
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there may be an underreporting of marriages since some 
men may be married 
to more than one woman. 
Finally, in relating the dependent variable CBR with t
he independent 
variables a relevant question is whether or not a time
 lag should be used 
in the analysiso As mentioned before~ the estimated C
BR refemto average 
fertility rate over a period of ten years, whereas the
 values of the 
It would
independent variables are point estimates in a given c
ensus year. 
be inappropriate to relate the value of an independent
 variable for a 
given year to the a,rerage GBR of the ten-year period p
receeding it; that is 
to relate the crude birth :~ate of say, the 1955-65 per
iod with the values 
Thus the choice was to take eitherof the independent variables for 1965, 
the 1960 values for the independent variables--which m
eans no lag--or to 
take the 1955 values, that is a five-year lag, 
One was thatTwo considerat::.ons favored a no-lag alternative. 
the results with no lag were not significantly differe
nt from the five­
The other was that if a five-year lag alternativeyear lag alternative. 
were chosen the tiree period to be studied would be fur
ther shortened 
without much compensation gained in terms of the accur
acy of results. 
As it is, only four periods could be considered. Crud
e birth rate 
estimates for the 1935-45 period could not be used bec
ause data are not 
available for the independent variables in 1940, and 
1965 data for the 
independent variables could not be used since they wou
ld relate to the 
1960-70 crude bixth rates which are not available at p
resent. Thus, the 
crude birth rate estimates that are employed in this 
study refer to the 
and 1955--65 periods, and the corresponding1940-50, 1945-55, 1950--60 t 
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independent variables are for the 1945, 1950~ 1955 and 1960 census years. 
The analysis itself consists of two parts. In the first part the 
interrelationships among the variables are examined in depth, using 
simple correlation and ranking techniques" The purpose is twofold. One 
is to understand the basic relationship between the dependent variable and 
the indeper..dent variables o The second purpose is to examine the inter­
dependence and collinearity among the independent variables. This also 
serves the purpose of providing the necessary information for the ap­
propriate use of multiple reg;::e.ssion which is applied in the second part 
of the analysis. In this second part, an &t tempt is made to approximate 
a functional relationsh:i.:p , from bot'.1. ctcsb-sectional as well as pooled 
data, between CER arid the d.cvelopment va:::Lables, :18 ,Jall as among some 
of the more important indepencien;:: variai.• les, 
III. :'lE PA'ITERI'i' OF PROVINCIAL CRUDE DIRTH RATES AND 
INTK{RiLATIONSdIPS Af10UG THE VARIABLES 
III.1 Variations in the Pattern cf Provincial Crude Birth Rates 
The CBR estin1ates show a distinct teraporal trend in the national 
average rate (Table 2). First there was a period of increasing birth 
rates--from 46"6 per thousand in 1935-45 to 49.2 in 1940-50 and 50.4 in 
1945-55. Then t~e national CBR started to decline--to 47 per thousand 
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in 1950-60 and to an all-time low of 44.1 in 1955-65.
1 
Several factors 
seem to have influenced this pattern. First is the adverse impact of 
World War II on fertility during the 1935-45 period. There was a large 
mobilization and a sizeable number of men were kept under arms from 1939 
to 1945. Living conditions deteriorated and there were serious food 
shortages. But with normalization of the situation, Turkey appeared 
to share the widespread "post-war baby boom" phenomenono Also, the 
all-time high national CIX in 1945-55 seems to be especially related to 
the remarkable overall economic expansion from 1950 to 1954. National 
output expanded i.i.t a r.:ite of more L1an ten percen:: annually. Due to rapid 
expansion of cu:';.-civat:ed land and gooci weather conditions, the increase in 
farm output was even more impressive. Such a rapid increase in income 
level might have had a short-r--1n encou:..·agir.g effect on fertility. Appendix 
B gives a review of Gocio-ecor.cmic chanr;es in :urkey for the 1945-1965 
period. 
Table 1 provides the frequency dist!'ibution of provincial CBR's 
in different ti.me periods,. Overall the provincia: CBR' s show patterns 
similar to the national average, In 1935-45 there was a heavy concentra­
tion of crude birth rates around 50 per thousand. During the two 
1
The preliminary results of the 1970 Census indicate a 2.6 per­
cent annual population grm..th rate for the 1965- 70 period, the same as 
in 1960-65. If it is assumed that mortality continued to decline, then 
the birth rates must have continued to decline in the 1965-70 period, 
also. Acttially the p!.'esumed decline in mortality is quite plausible in 
view of continuing overall imp::-ovenents achieved in living standards 
and health conditions during- this period" Also, there is no evidence 
to suggest that the histcri-::al con ~inuous decline in mortality was 
checked in this perioc, 
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Table l 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF PROVINCIAL CRUDE BIRTH RATES (CBR), 1935-65 
CBR per 1,000 
Population 1935-45 1940-50 1945-55 1950-60 1955-65 
64. 0 and over 2 7 9 6 3 
60.0-63.9 5 6 5 4 3 
56.0-59.9 7 5 9 5 6 
52.0-55.9 8 8 6 11 11 
48.0-51. 9 12 10 12 8 9 
44.0-47.9 0;, 10 7 7 5 
40.0-43.9 9 8 7 12 7 
36.0-39.9 5 6 6 6 8 
Under 36.0 5 2 1 3 10 




PARTITION VALUES Al.'l'D HEASURES OF DISPERSICN OF PROVINCIAL 
CRUDE BIRTH RATES, 1935-65 
(Per thousand population) 
Partition lines 1935-45 1940-50 1945-55 1950-60 1955-65--·~--
National CBR 
(Weighted average) 46;6 49,2 50.4 47.0 44.1 
Median 49.2 49,4 5L3 49.7 48.6 
Lower Quartile 42.2 L,3. 7 44.8 42.2 39.3 
Upper Quartile 54.6 57,2 58.4 56.0 54.1 
Interquartile Ranee 12.4 13.5 13.6 13.8 14.8 
Ratio of Inter-
quartile Range 
') t; ') ') 7 '< 
O-WJM If, - , .Jto 11edian .265 .2 77 .304 
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following periods the number of provinces in tlv, hi8her crude birth 
rate class intervals increa0ed, particularly i.1 1945-55. The number of 
provinces with a CBR of 48 per thousand or more was 41 in the 1945-55 
period~ compared to 34 in 1935·-45. According to our estimates, after 
the 1945-55 period the CBRvs gradua1-ly declined. The pattern of the 
1950-60 period was actually not very much different from the 1935-45 one 
as far as the number of provinces in each class interval is concerned. 
A further downward shift in CBR is E:.Vident iu the 1955-65 frequency 
distribution, For example; tLe numbe:: of pr:.)Vj_nces :vith a crude birth 
rate of less than 36 per ·::housand jumped to 18~ as compared to between 
7 and 10 for the earl:i.er periods,. 
These trends are note clee.rly shown in Table 2 where the value 
of the average CBR for Terkey and the values of the nedian, the lower 
and the upper quartilen ere given. The values of the median for the 
provinces follow., a pattern similar to that of the national CilR with 
the exception of the 1955-65 value which is similar to the median value 
for the first pe!"iod, 1935-45. A somewhat more pronounced pattern is 
observed with the lcwer quartile values. The lower quartile value in 
1955-65 is 39 per thousand representing a decline of 3 points per 
thousand from the corresponding value in 1935-45. 
It is interesting to note that the ratio of the interquartile 
range to the median, a measure of 'relative dispersion,' is high through­
out the period and does not indicate any noticeable convergence of the 
crude birth rates anonz the provinces. This is to be expected as there are still 
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marked differentials in regional socio•-econo:n::..c development levels. In 
light of historical e:{pe:::-ier.ce, the general hypothesis is that only at 
a high development level do regions become homogenous in their socio­
economic characteristics, Regional disparities are more e..~treme in 
the early stages of modern economic growth, as is evident in the Turkish 
case where only a few of the geographical regions have become increasingly 
industrialized and urbanizedo 
III.2 Interrelationships among the Vari2.b"!.es 
In order to investigate the interrelat::Lonsh:Lps among the variables 
included in this study~ th-2: provinces were ranked accordinB to CBR for 
each time period aad according to the independent variable values in cor­
responding years. Table 3 provides the rank order cor::::-elation between 
CBR and different socio-economic variables, ar.d among the latter for 
each time period. Section A of Table 3 reveals that the highest rank 
order correlations between CBR and the independent variables are for 
the level of literacy variable in all periods. The coefficients' signs 
are negative as expected and the values are around 0.80. Also note 
that female literacy has a hi8her correlation coefficient with CBR than 
has male literacy. These high values exist because literacy encompasses 
several factors, most of uhich seen to have a negative relationship with 
fertility. It represents both an information or knowledge variable with 
respect to fertility cont~ol and modern medical practices and, as mentioned 
before, the effects of social and economic adva~cement, and as such gives 
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Table 3 
RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS A:'ION;..; CRUDE BIRTH RATES 
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
A. CRUDE BIRTH RATES * 
CRUDE BIRTH RATES AND: 
Level of Literacy 
MLIT 
FLIT 
Industrial Distribution of Male Labor Force 
AGR 
IND 




Female Labor Force Participation 
RFLF 
Female Marital Rates 
!~ALE LITER.ACY .A..ND: 











































1950 1955 1960 
-0.796 -0.781 -0.841 
-0.836 -0.862 -0.911 
0.446 0.589 0.590 
-0.437 -0.558 -0.631 
-0.265 -0.419 -0.491 
-0.272 -0.404 -0.479 
-0.178 -0.356 -0.437 
-0.479 -0.647 -0.586 
0.527 0.470 0.526 
-0.590 -0.637 -0.680 
0.577 0.658 o. 727 
0.394 0.446 0.547 
0.380 0.411 0.503 
0.306 0.375 0.457 
0.622 0.731 0.686 
-0.544 -0.490 -0.634 
0.947 0.944 0.949 
-0.565 -0.581 -0.606 
0.547 0.595 0.653 
0.414 0.458 0.157 
0.402 0.435 0.498 
0.334 0.413 0.458 
0.573 0.688 0.609 
-0.451 -0.417 -0.559 
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Table 3 (continued) 
c. INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MALE LABOR FORCE 
1945 1950 1955 1960 
LABOR FORCE IN AGRICULTURE AND: 
URB02 :..0.191 -0.802 -0.770 -0.808 
URB05 -0.765 -0.798 -0.756 -0. 775 
URBlO -0.735 -0.748 -0.760 -0.785 
RFLF -0.799 -0.828 -0.793 -0.712 
RMART 0.490 0.526 0.483 0.596 
IND -0.947 -0.982 -0.966 -0.969 
LABOR FORCE IN INDUSTRY AND: 
URB02 0.735 0.759 o. 722 0.755 
URB05 o. 723 0.771 0.706 o. 723 
URBlO 0.668 o. 705 0.710 0.739 
RFLF 0.847 0.827 0.807 0.707 
RMART -0.487 -0.527 -0.480 -0.606 
D. LEVEL OF URBANIZATION 
URBANIZATION 02 AND: 
URB05 0.956 0.968 0.978 0.982 
URBlO 0.931 0.941 0.935 0.939 
RFLF 0.662 0.696 . 0.688 0.622 
RMART -0.308 -0.419 -0.274 -0.475 
URBANIZATION 05 AND: 
URBlO 0.950 0.960 0.960 0.955 
RFLF 0.628 0.691 0.672 0.583 
RMART -0.258 -0.442 -0.247 -0.450 
URBANIZATION 10 :A:f\1D: 
RFLF 0.591 0.609 0.657 0.585 
RMART -0.256 -0.379 -0.251 -0.462 
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Table 3 (continued) 
E. FEIIALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
1945 1950 
FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND: 





*CBR estimates are for ten-year periods centering around the years shown 
in corresponding columns (for example 1945 refers to 1940-50 period). 
Definition of the variables: 
r1LIT Percentage of total males literace. 
FLIT Percentage of total females lite::.:-ate. 
AGR Percentage of male workers 15 years and over in agriculture sector. 
IND Percentage of male workers 1.L.J ~ years and over in industry sector. 
URB02 Percentage of total population living in settlements 2,000 and over. 
URBOS Percentage of ::otal population living in settlements 5,000 and over• 
URBlO .. Percentage of total population living in settlements 10,000 and over•• 
RFLF Percentage of females 15 years and over in non-agricultural sectors• 
RHART Percentage of females 15 years and over married• 
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a rough indication of the aspiration level of the population for material 
goods. 
The correlation coefficients between CBR and the variables represent­
ing the industrial distribution of male labor force, female labor force 
participation, urbanization and marital rates all have expected signs, 
though with considerably lower values than the literacy variables. The 
values of the coefficients for the industrial distribution of male labor 
force do not vary significantly between agr:i.culture and industry. Among 
the three urbanization variables included, the correlation coefficients 
are slightly higher for t:1e 2,000 and over and 5 ,OGO and over urban 
population le•.,-els, D'.lt the relationship between Ci3K and urbanization 
seems to be weaker than E-xpected in aL. tl11:ee cases, Hmvever, it is 
worthwhile to note that the pace of urba:liz2tion ire Tur~ey has accelerated 
since World War r:::, and a significant portion of this increased urban 
population consists 8£ :cural-to-urban migrants. It is quite plausible 
that the fertility pattern oi ti:1ese migrants remains unaffected by 
urbanization for a considerable lene;th of time, thus dilutine the over­
all negative influence of urbanization on fertility. 
In the remaining sections of Table 3, interrelations among the 
independent variables are explored. The purpose is to learn more about 
the independent variables before an attempt is :nade to approximate a 
model to measure the causality between CBR and the independent variables. 
Table 3 reveals that the femele literacy variable, which has the highest 
correlation with the CBR, has lower correlation coefficients with the 
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1other independent variables than do the otter literacy variables --there 
is less incidence of mul tico11:i.nea:r:ity. This reinforces the choice of 
f ema1 iteracy among ch iteracy varia· ~es. 
21 . fe rem tie1 ree 1 · b, The choice between 
the proportion of male workers in agriculture and industry is less 
obvious and either of the twc can be taken to represent the level of 
industrialization or non-industriaJ.izationo Finally, the urbanization 
variable defin,iad as the percentage of people living in areas with a 
population of 5,0JG or more seems to be preferable to the other urban-
ization variables in terns of the degree of multicollinearity present. 
It is also of interest to obsei:ve how the provinces rank in terms 
of CBR and other variables, as well as how the ranking changes over time. 
In Table 4, the provinces are c:'..assified :Lnto three grcups according to 
their CBR' s in thE: 1940--50 period, G:~oup A consists of twenty provinces 
with CBR' s of 55 per tl:ousant~ or over, and purely for convenience these 
provinces are labelled as hiBE!_ fertility provinces; grcup B contains 
twenty-five provinces with CBR I s betweeE 45 ~md 55 per thousand, labelled 
1
Results with resrect to total literacy rate are not reported here 
as this variable behaves very similarly to male literacy. 
2
simple correlation coefficients among the independent variables 
are usuall? used as a simple rule of thumb to 2au8e the degree of multi­
collinearity i='robler.1 and to establish reasonable statistical independence 
among the independent variables It is important to note, however, 
that one should not e.lways rule out, a priori, the inclusion of two 
independent variables highly co::rela.::ed to eac:.1 other. The nature and 
specification of the variable,:; should be .:::arefully scrutinized. For a 
useful discussion of the multicoi.linearity problem, see Potluri Rao and 
Roger LeRoy Hiller, Api)J.ied Econonetrics (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, 1971)~ pp, 4,;·-s2< 
- 37 -
as average fertility provinces; group Chas the remaining seventeen 
provinces with CBR's of less than 45 per thousand and these provinces 
are labelled as low fertility provinces. 
The most striking impression one gets from looking at the table 
is the high degree of regional homogeneity in each group of provinces. 
In the high fertility group, eighteen provinces are located in the 
eastern part of the country, and the two remaining provinces are in 
central Anatolia. On the other hand, the low fertility provinces 
are geographically located in the West or No::-~h-west. It is an estab­
lished fact that the eastern provinci::,s of Turkey are far less developed 
than the we stern ones, as t:1e ranking of '.:he p,:ov:i.nces according to 
socio-economic variables in TabJ.e L, also indicates. The eastern 
provinces have relativel}7 low liteYacy, 2nd low le.vels of :Lndustrial-
ization and urbanization, It ,wuld be real:!..ct:Lc to assume that the 
high CBR 1 s in these provinces are associatec: ,;ith the low levels of :social 
and economic achievemenL However~ a close examination of the data 
suggests that there !'lay be more tc this regional pattern. Distance from 
the western seaboard may in itself be a significant factor in deter-
mining fertility behavior. It has been argued that the populations 
living in the western provinces of Turkey have been in closer contact 
with European communities throughout history. There also has been a 
continuous exchange of populations. It is plausible that the population in 
contact with European communities has been affected by the nonns and 
values, including ·::he fanily si::..:e ,prevailing ~n that part of the world. 
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Table 4 
RANKING OF PROVINCES BY CRUDE BIRTH RATES AND SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
CBR FLIT RMART IND URil05 RFLF 
1940- 1945- 1950- 1955-
Province 50 55 60 65 1945 1950 1955 1960 1945 1950 1955 1%0 1945 1950 1955 1960 1945 1950 1955 1960 1945 1950 1955 1960 
A. Provinces With High Crude Birth Rates, 1940-50 
Mus 1 1 3 4 61 55 58 57 1 1 2 3 61 62 52 54 51 50 52 52 62 62 60 51 
Hakkari 2 2 1 1 62 62 62 62 5 4 5 7 62 59 62 58 60 60.5 61~5 61.5 61 39 62 30 
Siirt 3 4 4 10 58 57.5 60 60 10 6 6 6 31 30 39 43 37 44 48 40 48 41 57 55 
Agr1 4 10 7 8.5 54 60 56 59 3 5 12 4 60 61 58 62 44 52 44 48 58 61 48 16 
JHtlis 5 3 6 3 57 57.5 57 56 41 3 10 10 50 50 46 44 30 36 15 26 57 45 51 59 
Van 6 5 5 2 55 59 55 55 4 8 9 13 56 57 55 57 43 35 40 41 50 33 47 37 
Mardin 7 8 10 7 59 61 61 61 19 29 25 19 44 46 50 53 42 37 38 36 49 44 55 58 
lHngol 8 7 8 6 60 54 54 54 2 2 8 5 43 41 54 61 60 60.5 58 59 59 56 58.5 56 
Maras 9 9 9 8.5 51 51 50 51 11 10 13 9 32 26 32 41 29 25 31 32 28 26 27 36 
Tunceli 10 6 2 5 43 39 41 44 24. 14 16 12 57 51 61 55 60 60.5 61.5 61.5 52 54 61 60 
D:1.yarbakir 11 12 21 14 53 53 53 53 27 27 24 20 33 31 30 34 18 16 19 22 26.5 35 42 42 
Urfa 12 11 15 13 56 56 59 58 44 47 49 53 26 32 40 39 10 13 12 15 39 51 52 52 
Erzincan 13 15 12 21 29 25 26 29 22 24 34 35 49 36 31 30 48 46 47 44 34 40 43 50 
Kars 14 13 11 11 35 36 36 43 6 7 11 17 54 60 56 60 33 42 36 45 51 57 54 44 
Malatya 15 14 13 12 52 50 49 49 i~ 23 j3 .26 24 24 28 29 22 22 27 27 18 28 36 35 
Nigde 16 22 14 15 36 34 34 33 7 13 17 55 38 39 41 40 35 32 35 39 38 23 10 9 
Erzurum 17 35 30 2'1 AS 40 39 41 18 35 3 1 46 43 38 45 32 34 32 34 44 46 40 34 
Sivas 18 16 16 17 33 44 45 45 21 16 18 18 42 44 35 36 39 38 30 30 46 50 46 45 
Elazig 19 19 17 16 42 45 44 42 40 23 41 31 11 11 15 15 26 26 25 23 29 18 41 40 
Kenya 20 23 25 28 27 28 23 23 28 28 14 33 25 23 26 23 21 17 18 17 25 32 28 26.5 
B. Provinces with Average Crude Birth Rates, 1940-50 
Yozgat 21 24 27 22 44 43 46 46 13 25 19 21 58 58 60 59 56 56 56 54 60 58 56 62 
Kayser! 22 17 24 25 31 29 28 27 12 19 l 24 14 15 10 7 15 14 10 12 20 30 4 7 
Hazay 23 21 23 30 37 41 37 36 46 52 48 41 18 13 17 18 13 8 8 8 15 14 20 23 
Cankiri 24 28 29 23 34 31 29 32 9 9 4 36 52 54 49 51 47 51 53 55 53 55 49 61 
Adana 25 20 32 34 24 27 25 23 32 40 59 54 13 8 8 11 6 7 6 6 16 11 16 18 
Corum 26 18 33 31 41 42 43 40 8 12 15 2 47 45 48 49 40 40 41 37 47 47 53 54 
Gaziantep 27 30 35 33 48 47 47 47 26 32 39 37 6 6 6 8 5 5 4 4 22 19 15 28 
Antalya 28 27 34 36 23 22 21 21 52 53 54 52 27 29 36 25 36 41 42 35 12 16 30 29 
Icel 29 33 39 39 16 19 19 18 54 54 7 60 10 12 16 16 ll 10 ll 11 14 9 18 19 
·:_,) 
-·- .,-.-----···-
Table 4 (continued) ,;\ ::.i. - 39 -
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Another important p'.Ji.:1t about the high fertility p~ovinces is that 
with the exception of two ~Hovinces (naiuely Erzurum and Kenya) they 
remained in this ca.:egory throughout the entire -period under study. 
This is also true, though to a lesser extent, for the provinces in the 
average and low fertility categories. 
Table 4 also shows the changes over time in the ranking of the 
provinces by development variables. Some distinct features can immediately 
be seen from this table. In a number of provinces where CBR declined in 
relative terms, literacy rates, if not already high, improved. This 
pattern is also true with regard to CBR and the industrialization and 
urbanization variables. :2:ocaeli, Konya, Adana and Gaziantep provinces 
are good examples of this pattern. Similarly, provinces like lialatya and 
Ordu, which raised their ranking in C3R, louerecl it in terms of literacy, 
urbanization and ind;;;strialization, The relationship be~ween CBR and 
urbanization, as expectrad, is sor:1ewhat ~veake:r than in the case of the other 
development variables. It is ir.terestir:.g to note that provinces like 
Canakkale, Bilecik, Boln and Kastamonu, which rank very low in urbaniza­
tion, are also characterized among the lowest CBR provinces. At the other 
extreme, Urfa, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep and Adana are examples of both rel­
atively high levels of urbanization and CBR. However, it should also be 
noted that the latter provinces have singularly centered urban populations. 
Given similar urbanization levels, it is quite possible that the impact of 
singular urban concentration may be different from that of more evenly 
scattered urban centers. We do not, however._ have evidence as to whether 
urban fertility rates in these provinces are significantly lower than 
rural ones. 
Overall, the relationship between CBR and female labor force participa­
tion in non-agricultural activities appears to be as expected, with some 
important e..~ceptions. Denizli, Isparta, Burdur and Kayseri are relatively 
high fertility provinces but are also reported among the highest ranking 
in female labor force participation. However, the female workers in these 
provinces are primarily engaged in rug weaving or in using small textile 
machines. It seems that the impact on fertility behavior of the work 
participation in cottage type industries where the women usually work at 
home may not be very different from that of work participation in 
agricultural activities, reedless to say, a further distinction between 
traditional ana cottage industrie.s acd relativel;· more modern industries 
should have been made_ This, how~·ver, could not be cione as detailed infor­
mation on industrial disi:ribution was not ava:Llable. 
IV. REGRESSION Ai.~ALYSIS OF ?ROVINCIAL CRUDE BIRTH RATES 
The rank analysis in the preceding section supports our hypotheses about 
the relationship between provincial CBR and c.ifferent development variables. 
However, these results are not definitive in the sense of measuring causality. 
Here an attempt is madE: to approximate a model of functional relationships 
between CBR and a set of socio-P.conomic variables using regression analysis 
techniques. 
In this section, w2 will fi.rst d:Lsc1ss cross section re3ression 
results pertaining to prov:i_ncial CBR observati.ons in each of the four 
periods, i.e. 1940-50, 19/:5-SS, 1930--60, and 1955-65; and second, pooled 
regression results from combined cross s3ction and time series data•. 
IV.l Cross Section Results 
In light of the earlier discussion and the rank analysis results, 
we hypothesize that the more immediate variables affecting CBR are 
variables like marriage and literacy which directly affect the probability 
of child bearing. (The latter variable~ as mentioned before, includes 
knowledge of fertility control as well as being a crude empirical proxy of 
aspiration levels for material goods vis-a-vis children.) To verify the 
validity of this proposed re:lati0n.;hip, we attempted regressing CBR 
directly on different combinations ,:.:,f other sod.o-economic variables under 
different hypotheses, Tl1e results were either an equation with insig­
nificant coefficients or an E:quation explain~::is; very little of the 
variance in CBR. It seems that the other development variables really 
influence literacy and marital levels and not fertility levels directly. 
Within our data constraints~ we suggest a model of chain relationships of 
the following type to approximate the Turkish situation: 
... 43 .• 
The following variab·Les ,ire sf•lected ::or ti:lis mode~'-: 
CBR C:rnde bi:.::+ rate p2r thousand 
FLIT Female li~eracy rate 
RHART Refined £2:c.:ale marital ~ate, Le, for females fifteen
yea:·s and ·::Ner 
Industrialization ::.Yvic l, measured as proportion of male
workers fifteer. years and ove.r in the agriculture sector 
1 rt should be noted that the inr1ustrialization variab1e (measured as
the proportion of male workers in either the industry sector or in the agricul­
ture sector) and the urbanization variaole are interdependent (Table 3) and
behave similarly and eitl:er of the two could have been used. However, as
mentioned before, industrialization is more highly correlated with fertil-
ity (Table 3) dnd seems to be a better measure of the economic development
level. 
2 
rt is quite possible that a direct relationship exists between fer­
tility and total female :_abor force part ic.ipation - However, as mentioned
before,,-,e were able to measure only non-agricultural work participation
and so the iatter var:i.able may at bA.st ~:2 appropriate only ·in the urban setting. 
3
Different ::.:ets of e.·:paticns were also run using ",-roportion of male
workers 15 years and over :i.n the indust:.cy sec'.~or" as the industrialization
variable. Given the degr'ce of inte::dependence between A.GR and IND (Table 3)
the results we:.:e qi.:it~ s:L'llilar. AGT{. 1,.:.:.s se1e,..'.tec'. as the more appropriate
variable as it 3ive:> ::itatisticall-y bet·;-er results" 
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RFLF Refined female non-agricultural labor force participation 
rate, i.e. for females fifteen years and over 
It should be mentioned at the outset that three provinces, namely 
Istanbul, Kastamonu and Kutahya, are excluded from all the cross· section 
and pooled equations. ::r:stanbul province represents an extreme unit of 
observation and the other two provinces are highly deviant from the 
general pattern of the hypothesized relationship. 
Table 5 provides a set of six equations approximating the chain 
relationships for each of the four time periods under consideration. The 
results seem to be quite consist~~nt over time. The primary or CBR 
equations, numbered (1) in the table, shovr that FLIT and PJ.IART combined 
account in each pE,riod for more than seven-tentts of the regional varia­
tion in CBR. Standard errors of the esti-c.1ates/SEv, used as indicators 
of the accuracy of the ex-planatiot'-S, are qui.te 1ow--less than 10 per cent. 
The coefficients or parameters of both in6ependent variables sub­are 
stantial, particularly in the earlier periods. For example, in the 1940-
50 CBR equation, FLIT coefficient is -0.89 and RNART, 0.90,implying 
that in a typical Turkish province, CBR would be lower by almost nine­
tenths of a point if FLIT were larger by one percentage point or if 
RMART were lower by one point. Of the independent variables, FLIT 
emerges with the lower standard error and i.s consistently statistically 
significant at the one percent level. In the following the relative 
:importance of these two explanatory va::-iables is discussed in more 
detail. 
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..... -~. Table 5 
CROSS SECTION REGRESSION EQUATIONS* 




I. CBR, 1940-50 
1) CBR = 0.977 - 0.892 FLIT+ 0.901 R MART 
(0.100) (0.214) 
o. 725 4.88 
2) FLIT= 42.301 - 0.410 AGR 
(0.085) 
0.290 6.04 
3) R MART= 53.708 + 0.161 AGR 
(0.042) 
0.205 2.99 
4) FLIT= 8.060 + 1.478 RFLF 
(0.501) 
0.132 6.68 
5) R MART= 67.522 - 0.795 RFLF 
(0.228) 
0.175 3.05 




l. .... CBR, 1945-55 




2) FLIT= 54.431 - 0.516 AGR 
(0.101) 
0.315 7.07 
3) R MART= 53.452 + 0.188 AGR 
(0.042) 
0.262 2.93 
4) FLIT= 9.455 + 1.714 RFLF 
(0.508) 
0.167 7.79 
5) R MART= 70.160 - 0.766 RFLF 
(0.198) 
0.209 3.03 




Table 5 (continued) 
R2 SE 
III. CBR, 1950-60 
1) CBR = 33.612 - 0.809 FLIT+ 0.406 R MART o. 779 4.41 
(0.064) (0.160) 
2) FLIT = 57.109 - 0.529 AGR 0.283 8.08 
(0.112) 
3) R MART= 63.257 + 0.116 AGR 0.086 3.64 
(0 0050) 
4) FLIT = 12.747 + 1.534 RFLF 0.146 8.82 
(0.491) 
5). R MART = 72. 830 - 0 .241 RFU' 0.023 3.76 
(0.210) 
6) RFLF = 11.177 - 0.118 AGR 0.227 2.09 
(0.029) 
IV. CBR 1 1955-65 
l) CBR = 39.487 - 0.774 FLIT+ 0.296 R MART 0.836 3.90 
(0.057) (0.203) 
2) FLIT = 59.033 - 0.547 AGR 0.300 8.90 
(0.111) 
3) R MART = 64.284 + 0.146 AGR 0.272 2.55 
(0.032) 
4) FLIT = 14.488 + 1.726 RFLF 0.160 9.75 
(0.524) 
5) R MART= 75.673 - 0.228 RFLF 0.035 2.94 
(0.158) 
6) RFLF = 10.147 - 0.107 AGR 0.213 2.19 
(0.027) 
*In each equation, number of observations is 59. 
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There is a continuous decline in the absolute size of the tw
o regression 
The decline in the absoluteparameters in the CBR equations over time. 
value of the FLIT coefficient from 0.89 in 1940-50 to 0.77 in 
1955-65 
is, however, not as pronounced as the corresponding decline 
in the Rr1ART 
coefficient from 0.90 to 0.30. An explanation for this declin
e in the 
influence of fillART on CBR is not difficult. Firstly, the re
portin8 of 
marital status improved considerably over time. In the ear
ly periods, 
the proportion of couples married according to Islamic tradi
tion, and 
not under civil law, was large. It is very likely that a nu
mber of 
these marriages were not reported, particularly if the coup
les did not 
have any children. As a result, there existed a built-in bias
 for a 
high correlation between narria3e and fe:::-tility in the earl
ier years. 
Even though the practice of ma::-ryin3 outside the civil law sti
ll exists, 
particularly in the villa3es, the ?}:oportion :::as declined co
nsiderably 
over time. This obse~vation is supported oy the statistics on
 marital 
rates. Refined marital rates increased. fron 65 per cent in 
1945, to 
and to 74 per cent inJ.. 7.JJ67 per cent in 1950, to 71 per cent in 
1 nc r:: 
' 
In this sense, the1960, before it dropped to 70 per cent in 1965. 
high RMART coefficients of 1940-50 and 1945-55 may largely be on
ly 
A second and perhaps more important reason forstatistical artifacts. 
the declining RHART coefficients may be that adult female ex
pectation of 
life at age 5 (i.e. e5 
0 
) improved significantly over the period--from 
49.6 years in 1935-40 to 61.9 years in 1960-65.
1 Therefore, on the 
1Frederic ;:; • Snorter, a Information on Fertility, iiortality an
d Pop­
ulation Growtl;. in Tu~key,
11 Population Index, January-1:iarch, 1968, Table 1. 
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average, a married woman in the earlier periods had fewer unproductive 
or infecund years to live (i;e. years after age of 44 or 49). In more 
recent periods, there is a relatively larger number of married women 
past the reproductive age. In other words~ the average proportion of 
the reproductive age span in total life-time has declined considerably 
over time. 
The above phenomena also seem to be largely responsible for the 
marked variation in the constant term. Concomittant with the decline 
in the RHART coefficient, the value of the intercept increases sub­
stantially over time, i.e. the statistical relationship between filrART 
and CBR weakens. 
The influence of FLIT on CBR has remained relatively stable and 
strong over time even thoueh there has been significant increases in 
the spread of literacy among women. (Note that ~"LIT does not have 
a coverage bias like Ri-IART does,) In light of our earlier discussion 
about the nature of this varia"'.Jle, it seems that influence of the 
spread of modernization on fertility leve}. is stabl8" As is show below, 
FLIT definitely appears as the representative of the level of changes 
in the socio-economic structure in the Turkish situation. 
Equations numbered (2) to (5) meas-;_:re the influence of AGR and 
RFLF on FLIT and IU-1ART, It should be borne in mind that here the 
purpose is not to explain the levels of FLIT and RHART per ~• There­
2fore the emphasis should not be on the level of R but on the statistical 
significance of the AGR and RFLF coefficients, namely their standard 
.• 1.,.9 ,. 
errors. Needless to say, literacy anc marit.al rates are determined not 
only by the industriaJ_i?:at:Lon :'.evel but also ty factors 1:ot included in 
our model. 
There seems to be a definite relationship between FLIT and AGR, and 
also between FLIT and RFLF. These re.lationships are much more significant 
and stable over time than the cor:.:espondi:ig ones for the RMART. As 
expected, RFLF is also signif:icaatJ..y affected by AGR as shown in equations 
numbered (6)" All the rE:.g:..\:.Ssi-:u eoefficients appear ·with expected 
signs and are gcnerelly highly s f.gnificant, 
IV .2 Pooled Regression R.e~ults and Concluding Remark 
In the e,up:.:ci.cal in,,c,:;tigat:i.on of the association between fertility 
and social and. econcmi;::: iev,,J.u:_-y:r.su,:, })irkis:1 data p:::-ovide a very rare 
opportunity to es .... imate a dynamic equation from p0oled cross section and 
time series datA. Sucb a dynamic. equation ,-1ill pz:-ovide a functional 
relationship appJ.icabl "· Loth ,1cross regions as well as across time. 
Needless to say j auch an estiaation has more practical value to policy 
makers than e:::.ther a corresponding cross section or time series equation. 
A very powe::ful econometi:ic techni-;iue, known as the I error components 
model' has been 1'."ecently developed to deal with such pooled data. Rec­
ognizing possible correlations among the err-or terms of a modeli this 
technique explicitly ::itterr.i)tf' to take them into acco...nt to increase 
the asymptotic P-fficiency of the ce.usal pa"."ameters -. This method accounts 
for three indepen<'.i.ent :omponentc; of reg:;:-es,.:.::ior.. error (assuming that there 
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are only three); separately associatetl. with ·cime, cross section unit 
1
(provinces, here) and i:1.teraction of the two, However, given the un-
stable nature of tte R."'1ART coefficie.nc, the model presented in Table 
25 could not pass the Chow test on stability of parameters--a pre­
requisite for using the error components model technique. 
The cross section results are, however, consistent enough to encourage 
estimation of the model from pooled data for all four time periods, 
though only permittini the use of a simple forr.i. of the more traditional 
and less rigorous method of dummy v,:.riables. We hypothesize that intro­
ducing time dummies will pick up tl1e inverted U-shaped variation in 
CBR which is net associated with any explanatory variable included in 
3the model, 
Thus our :-iypothe.sis is~ 
where D , D and D are time dummies suci, that:
45 50 55 
1
For examples, see T. D. Wallace and Ashiq Hussain, "The Use of 
Error Components Hodel in Combining Cross Section with Tine Series Data," 
Econometrica, VoL 37, No. 1, January 1969, pp. 55-72; Hare Nerlove, 
"Further Evidence on the Estimation of Dynamic Economic Relations From 
a T:ime Series of Cross Sections,'' Econometrica, Vol. 39, No. 2, March 
1971, pp. 359-396; G. S Haddala~ "The Use of Variance Components Model 
in Pooling Cross Section and ';:fe1e SerieE: Data, 11 op.ci_E. ,, pp. 341-357. 
2
Gregory Chow~ 11 Tests of Equality between Sets of Coefficients in 
Two Linear Regressions," Econometrica, Vcl. 28, Ho. 3, July 1960, pp. 
591-605. 
3
We also attempted to estimate t:-1e CBR equation from the pooled data 
of the last three periods, assumin8 a lin2ar neGative time trend. However 
the results obte.ined were weak, ,Hso r..ote the.t introducing time dummies 
allowed us to retain the 1940-50 period and estimate the equation from 
the data of all £our time periods 
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for ev~ry province for tiue period 1940-50, otherwise 0= 1D45 
for every province for tirr:.e ".leri.o<l l9L6-55, otherwise 0= 1nso 
= 1 for every province for time. j)eriod 1950-60, otherwise 0 D55 
Here a is the constant term and refers to the estimate of the intercept
1 
for the last time period, 1955-65. a, plus the coefficient of a specified 
.l. 
time dummy gives the estima-ce of the intercept for that period. For 
example, for tl1e 1940-:'0 per:Lod, th.·~~ i11tercept value is 17.26 + 2.84 = 
B the coefficients of FLIT and20.10 (Table 6), are2 
RMART, respectively-
Table 6 prov:i.des .a set of six pooled regression equations similar 
to that in Table 5. The estinated CBR equation justifies our hypothesis 
about including time. dummies and runni:.1g the rep;ressions on pooled 
data. The increase in the overa:1.l CBR in 1945-55 over the rate in 1940-
50 is picked up by the D50 coeffic
ient. Compared to the intercept 
value of 20.1 in 1940-50, the intercept value in 1945-55 is 22.5. Sim­
ilarly, the general decline in CBR after 1945-55 seems to be covered 
by the decrease in the intercept to 19.6 in 1950-60 and to 17.3 in 1955-
65. The relationship between CBR and FLIT seem to be relatively stable 
over time. The pooled FLIT coefficient is consistent with the FLIT 
section equations. The pooled PJIART coefficient,coefficients in the cross 
as one might expect it, appears t:o be an average cf the IDIART coef­
ficients of the four cross section equations in Table 5,
1 As in the 
1
rt is possible that t.he size of t:':1e time durr.my coefficier: ts is also 
influenced by ".:be averar;ing or the lC.f\J.zT coefficients. 
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Table 6 
* POOLED REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
(Below the regression coefficients are their standard errors) 
1) CBR = 17.260 - 0.804 FLIT+ 0.598 
(0.036) (0.097) 
RHART + 2.844 D
45 





FLIT= 47.418 - 0.491 AGR + 2.038 TIIIE 
(0.051) (0.445) 
RHART = 51.195 + 0.146 AGR + 3.233 Till:S 
( 0. 2 06) ( 0 .180) 
FLIT:::: 5.308 + 1,617 RFU'+ 2.35Ei 'l'Ll:C 
(0.250) (0.Z,82) 









6) RFLF '" 10.448 - 0.109 ACR 
(O. 013) 
0.245 
* In each equation, 2umber of observations is 236. 
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cross section eqt1ations, FLIT has a larger impact on CBR than has RMART 
2
and is statistically more significant~ In terms of both R and SE, the 
pooled CBR equaticn is statistically a good fit, 
Among the indepen.den t va?·iables, FLIT and IDIART appear to have 
linear time trends (A,pendix Table B-1)~
1 
The pooled equations numbered 
(2)-(5) hence i,tclude TIHE as an explanatory variable. In all these 
equations the TIHE cocffid.ants a:te large and statistically significant. 
As expected, however'. neither time dummies nor TilIE were significant in 
the RFLF equation (6) a.s RFLF has no distinct pattern of variation over 
time (Append:fx Table B-1). It is important to note that for the RMART 
equation (3)~ TIHE emerges as statistically more significnat than AGR. 
This seems to be due to the coverage biases previously discussed. In 
fact Til1E is responeible for a high value of R
2• On the other hand, 




In this cas~, the causal parameters from including time dummies 
or ; ::f~.:-~' i·:; ,,,~:~£ ,.;,ill be the same, with the latter equation having a 
simpler specificat:i..on. 
2
ThiG :!.s f,;r~h•?'.:' elahcre.ted by the following results of regressing 
FLIT, RHAP.T e.·:_·:. Rl'LF on 'l'U:TE. 
RMART:: 62cSJ5 -. 3.064 TIME R2 :: 0.510 SE= 3.38 
(0,197) 
FLIT ,., 7,892 + 2,608 THIE R2 = 0.097 SE= 8.95
(0.521) 
'
RFLF = 1~598 + 0,155 TIME R2 :, 00006 SE= 2.16
(0.126) 
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overall, the pooled coefficients of AGR in the FLIT, lll-IART and 
RFLF equations are in line with the corresponding coefficients in the 
cross section equations. This further establishes our contention about 
the stability of these relationships. The same is true for the rela­
tionship between FLIT and RFLF. However, comparison of the pooled RFLF 
coefficient in the RMART equati,::n (5) with t:1e correspond:!ng cross• 
section ones again suggest that the relationship between female labor 
force participation and female narital rate variables is not a stable 
one. 
Finally, as a concluding remark'., the pooled CBR equation is an 
explanation of fertility o7er past periods. However 1 even though one 
may not be able to exactly predict the future by using the pooled equations, 
the basic results are still valid. That is, if the female literacy 
level increases and the marital rate declines with increasing industrial• 
ization and female labor force participation levels, the fertility level 
in Turkey will decline. 
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APPENDIX A 
Explanatory Note on the Estimation of Provincial Crude Birth 
Rates, 1935-1965 
The q·uinquennial Turkish censuses since 1945 have reported the age 
distribution of the population by province. This information has enabled 
us to use reverse projection techniques
1 for estimating average CBR by 
province for the 1935-45, 40-50, 45-55, 50-60 and 55-65 periods. The 
formula for computing the average CBR between period t and t + 10 is as 
follows: 
P(0-9) t+lO l 
CBRt,t+lO = ( 10. 1 I Pt+5 
10 0 
where t refers to census year t, 
t+S refers to the census year 5 years after the census year t, 
t+lO refers to the census years 10 years after the census year t, 
P(0-9)t+lOrefers to population in age group 0-9 in census year 
t+lO, 
lOLO refers to the person-years lived between age O and 9 in 
a life table with a radix of 1.0, 
Pt+S refers to the total population enumerated in census year 
t+5. 
It 1 can easily be seen that the expression in brackets in the above formula 
1 see United Nations Hanual IV by Ansley J. Coale and Paul Demeny, 
Methods of Estimating Basic Demographic Heasures from Incomplete Data, ST/SOA/ 
Series A/42 (Hew York, 196 7), Chapter 4, Part D and E; Paul Demeny and F. C. 
Shorter, Estimating Turkish Hortality, Fertilitv, and Age Structures: AJ>pli­
cation of Some New Techniques, Reprint No. 53 (Ann Arbor, Population Studies 
Center, The University of llichigan), pp. 38-42. 
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gives the average yearly births for the 10 year. period, The appropriate 
denominator is the rnid·-period total population provided by the total popula­
tion figure reported in censm:: year t+S, In the following, we will discuss 
separately the two crucial variables in the above formula; namely the pop­
ulation in age group 0-9 and the mortality level" 
Population Q...9 
Age group Q...9 was selected for reverse projection of births instead 
of a perhaps more appropriate age group 0-4 mainly because the proportion of 
population under l'..i is reported more accurately by the censuses. The pro­
portion under- 5 is gene·~ally uncierstated, 
1 
For a. few provinces~ population 
under 10 was also erroneously repo:i::ted a:n.d rie~essitated adjustments of age 
distributions. 
Bes:i.d<:.s adjuct:me,:ts £or age miareporting, we faced another serious 
data limitation" Theoreticn.lly ,, the :cel1::::v"mt var:i.able fox· r.everse projections 
of avera3e ye.::i:rly bi.-ths is po;,u.l.at:i.011 Q,.9 born 5.n a province, irrespective 
of whether they m:2 living there, or not- But the censuses :i:eported only 
total populat:::.c'.l bcrn hy r1·ovince.., It is <:.asy to see that estimates of 
births ba:;e-:1. on popul:;1.~:!.on O··'.J e:mm:::.ratcd in the p:.:oviT(ce will be biased 
due to t1,.0\ r.::ig:cA.t.iu:i. 0.£:Ee~t:J. Fortunai.:ely, for the 1965 Census, special 
tabulations -,,;-e:ce a•;, x1.J.,1blc fa::- popl:..lat:i.on by place of enumeration and place 
of birth 2.nd by :i.ge .. This c1.Ll.cw,3d calculat ion of a correction factor for 
each province t'.:.,de:.: the. :c::Es1rnption that the relationship between the migration 
activity cf thP. i:otr-.1 populati::m and that of the population under 10 in 1965 
· - 5.1 -
were similar in the other census years. Applying these correction factors 
to the respective ratios of total population born to total population enumer­
ated gave the relevant ratios of population 0-9 born to population 0-9 
enumerated for the provinces. For general reference, estimates of CBR 
based on population 0-9 enumerated are given in Table A-2. 
Mortality Levels 
Hortality data at the province level is non-existent. Hith the infor­
mation provided by the recent Turkish Demographic Survey (TDS),life tables 
have been constructed for the provinces as grouped into five mortality areas. 
T 
Values of 10~0 provided by those life tables have been assumed for the 1955-
T 
1965 period (Table A-1). A national 10-UO value is obtained by taking the 
1weighted average of the 10 0 values for the five regions. This information 
was invaluable in the estimation of regional differentials in the mortality 
T 
levels for earlier periods, for which only national 10''-'0 values could be 
estimated. 
1The regional 10 0 were esti.Iaated assuming that the differential 
T 
between national and regional 10..... 0 values were. the same as in 1955-1965. 
It is assumed that within a region, mortality does not vary by province. 
Needless to say~ introducing mortality differential even by very broad regions 
is a vast improvement over assuming one mortality level for all the provinces. 
Levels of adult mortality (e~ i.e. expectation of life at age 5), 
estimated from intercensal sarvivorship rates) are available for Turkey at 
five years interval for the 1935-60 period. 1 With such information avail-
able, the usual procedure is to assume that a stable relationship exists 
1Ibid., Table 5. 
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between adult morc:ality and child mortality (under age 5) as in a set o
f 
1
regional model life tables, prepa~ed by Coale and Iemeny, mainly on th
e 
basis of European mortality experience< In the case of Turkey, this as
sump­
tion may be invalid" Sii.lce World War II, adult mortality has been impro
ving 
rapidly but the decline in child mortality has been sluggish. So the 
child 
mortality corresponding to adult mortality in a model life table will 
be 
much lower than the true level."
? 
However, with high adult mortality for 
the 1935-1945 pe~iod it is quite possible that a stable relationship did 
exist between adult e.nd child mortality and. that "the strongly deviant char
-
acter of the Turkish age pattern of mortality is of relatively recent 
origin. 113 For this period we app! 02:imated the level of child mortality 
(4LO) from the "r..ast" r:icdel li:Ee table
4 coLresponding to the e~ value for 
1940-45. It is releva:1.t to menticn that infant mortality, an indicator of 
child mortality, ,.n--.s more than 330 per thousand, i1hich appears to be quite
 
reasonable in light of experiences observeC:. elsewhere. 
1
Ansley J, Coale and P. De:neny, Regional Hodel Life Tables and Stable 
Populations_ (Princeton! Princeton Univers:.ty Press, 1966). 
2
For example, see Demeny and Shorter, pp" 27-28. 
3Ibid., p. 28, 
411
East" model life tables are based on mortality experience of Austria, 
The
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland a.,d North and Central Italy. 
reason for selectin8 th:.s family of life tables for Turkey is that they
 
A recent study also used "East"characterize high mor'.:ality in infancy. 
F. C. Shorter, "Infor­model for extrapolating cl-.ild mortality in Turkey" 
mation on Fertility, H'Jrtality and Population Growth in Turkey,
11 Popula-
tion Index, Vol. 34, ho. 4, Janua::y-l·1a:r.ch 1968, pp. 14-160 
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Fortunately the data in the Population Growth Surve:r of 1963 enabled 
the calculation of the conventional life-table measures of child mortality. 
Estimate II of 'proportion surviving from birth to age 2' (=.774) with re­
1
ference period as 1955-60 was used to select the appropriate East Hodel 
1
Life Table for extrapclating 10 0 values. Note that all the above cal­
culations were carried 0'1t separately for males and females. Results were 
combined by taking the weig11ted mean; with weights of L 05 for males and 
O. 95 for females ~ass;,.,ming a sex-ratio of 105 for Turkey). 
The mortality level. fol the intervenine; period, 19l,5-1955, were es­
timated assuming that the decline i.n tortality from the 1940-1945 level to 
1 
the 1955-1960 level was linear. Table A--1 shows 10 J values estimated for 
the different periods for the 5 mo1.:tality regions and Turkey as a whole. 
1




10 0 VALUES BY MORTALITY REGION, 1935-65 




Western and Coastal 
Provinces • 63524 .63873 .69929 • 75985 .79051 
Central and Eastern 
Provinces .5 7439 .5 7754 .63230 068705 . 71478 
Ankara Province ,61926 .62266 •68170 • 74073 . 77063 
Istanbul Province .66973 .67341 0 73726 .80110 .83343 
Izmir Province • 65454 •65813 • 72053 • 78293 .81452 
Turkey .60991 • 61326 .67140 • 72 954 • 75898 
1 11955-65 estimates of 10 0 provided by Frederic Co Shorter, 




J.~.... ,cmmE BITI.TH BY PROV:!:NCE 
1935-65 
(Per thousand population) 
1935-45 1940-50 194S-.'.:i5 1950-60 1955-6_:_; 
PROVINCE CBR~ **CBR2 CBR1 CBR,., L. CBR1 CBR2 CBR1 CBR2 CBR1 C:SR,., L. 
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Table A-2 (continued) 
1935-45 1940-50 1945-55 1950-60 1955-65 




60.04 56.63 55.13 56.06 53.82Malatya 54.23 54.57 57.82 58.30 60.16 
43.26 40. 78 41.66 35.20 36.51Manisa 40.25 39.79 42.15 41.68 43.30 
Maras 58.32 58.97 61.84 62.53 63.98 64.47 61.85 60.01 58.32
 56.17 
64.80 63.39 61.81 59.53 58.51 55.93Mardin 62.52 62.78 64.98 65.25 
Mugla 42.39 43.38 43.25 44.26 44.16 44.29 41.57 41.51 39.11 
38.93 
Mus 64.07 68.72 71.93 77 .15 72.41 75. 72 66.21 68.13 62.69 
63.19 
Nigde 56.08 57.47 56.61 58.12 56.47 56.52 56.60 55.46 54.13 5
1.63 
Ordu 51.34 53.03 49.73 51.37 50.90 50.29 52.12 50.59 52.30
 50.47 
Rize 49.64 46.08 49.16 45.64 53.14 49.58 54.02 50.32 50.69 
47.42 
52.48 49.73 51.60 47.36 49.42 45.46 46.38Samsun 46.48 50.77 48.05 
67.82 69.62 69.87 65.86 65.75 57.94 58.63Siirt 61.23 59.98 69.23 
49.15 46.30 46.33 42.52 41.82 44.12 41.50Sinop 45.79 48.63 46.28 
58.60 57.84 58.11 55.70 54.52 53.27 49.37Sivas 53.59 56.09 55.99 
44.25 40.75 43.01 38.45 38.84 34.22 32.94Tekirdag 33.83 37.50 39.93 
57.81 49.73 50.06 50.97 50.75 49. 77 49.14Tokat 53.59 55.23 48.16 
47.42 52.12 50.23 55.36 51.81 51.72 48.27Trabzon 44.88 44.47 47.85 
64.16 66.98 65.22 66.67 63.22 65.51 57.65Tunceli 56.67 58.96 61. 66 55.28 53. 71Urfa 58.28 58.76 61.15 61.65 62.68 63.33 56.43 56.15 
Van 63.67 63.82 66.08 66.23 68.49 68.61 65.54 64.97 64.20 64.5
5
52.22 50.22Yozgat 47.47 51.53 54.09 56.93 55.82 61.80 51. 71 50.73 
43.98 44.74 46.22 48.53 42.11 44.78 40.69 43.21Zonguldak 41.11 41. 82 
*CBR1 refers to crude birth rate estimated from population 
in age group 0-9 ~ in the 
province.
**CBR2 refers to crude birth rate estimated from population in ag
e group 0-9 enumerated 
in the province. 
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APPENDIX B 
A Rcvi'.:!w_ of Soci'1-Ei::ononic Changes_in Turkey 
The purpose of this appendh: is to quickly familiarize the reader 
with economic <>nc:1. svcL1.l development in 'I.urkey in recent decades. Host 
of the criteriE used iu ide:nti:~ieation of unde:rd1weloped countries apply 
to Turkey. Per Cdp:i.ta iucom0. i3 relatively low:; at approxima-cely U.S. 
dollars 275 in 1971 at the cffic:Lal :·ate of exchange; about two-thirds 
of the total 'llale work forc2 :'..s engaged in agriculture,; over forty 
per cent of the value-2.dd,~d odginates :Ln agriculture and more than 
eithty percent of t~e sxport ea1-nings come from agricultural exports; 
slightly more than fifty pe:t cent of the adult population is still 
illiterate; the crude birth rate ::l.s h:i.gh at nearly fo-;::ty·•f:1..ve per 
thousand; mortc.l:i.ty, and particularly infant mo1:tali.ty O is very high, 
Despite such sim:.Ua:ci tie.2 with other unde:::·developed cocnt ries, however, 
Turkey's experien,::e with ec::momi,--: dev2lopment is somew1:1at unique. 
Turkey was never subjectP.<l to colonial rul::i despite the increasing 
influence and control cf foreign ir.tere.sts during the declining years 
of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the lat'3 19th ar.. rl. early 20th 
centuries" The Ottomans, who once contr-:,llcd c:. large territory in Eastern 
Europe~ North A:i:rica.) &.nd the Uiddlc East:: were a conglome!"ate of differ­
ent national and ;:-:,thr.:i.c groups, Th12 Ottomans emerged frou1 World lvar I 
as losers anc:1. most :.)f the ter::::itory once controlleC: was losto The modern 
Turkish Republic, which was pro.::::.a:i.,:-ied in 192 3 ~ is composed of a more 
ethnically homog.:,nous populat~.on a::-.d is confined 'l!ainlv to Anatolia or 
.... ·..... 
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Asia Minor with a relatively small part known as the Thrace in Eastern 
Europe. 
Beginning in the early 1920's under the strong leadership of Kemal 
Ataturk, Turkey began making efforts to alter its socio-economic 
structure and to achieve self-sustaining economic development. A 
number of far-reaching social, cultural, and political reforms were 
carried out within a relatively short span of time. Also, the govern­
ment assumed a strong leadership position in encouraging economic 
development. The declared goal of this early period was to rapidly 
modernize the country, to raise the standard of living, and eventually 
to "catch up" with the Western world, 
In order to achieve these au1i-.:ious goals: all the stumbling 
blocks inhibiting the modernizaticn o:c the country had to be removed. 
First, the sultanate a::id then the ca1ipI1ate ,,ere abolished, the 
Islamic religious legal .system was repl2.ce.( by codes borrowed from 
different European count:ries, and the reiigious schools were closed; 
all with the purpose of breaking away from the religious dogmas and 
traditional values that nurtured adverse reactions to modernization 
and progress. Also the Latin c1lphabet r-:.=placed the Arabic script, and_ 
an international calendar, clock and metric system were introduced. 
Even wearing apparel was deliberately changed so that the Turk would 
adopt a Western outlook. Important changes were made in the legal 
status of women; a new civil lau outlawed poligamy, and women were given 
equal opportunity in education and the professions as well as the right 
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to vote. 
In the economic sphere, after an initial period of trial and error 
in the 1920's, a policy of "etatism" was adopted and the government 
took an active role in &uidini:; economic life and development. In pur­
suance of this policy a number of state economic enterprises were_ 
established to invest in areas where private efforts were inadequate in 
terms of capital and experience< Infrastructure was also given attention 
and the main emphasis was put on railroad construction. 
It is difficult to quantify the impact of these changes on the 
society, even in terms of economic growth. Statistics indicate that 
industrial output rose rapidly d.ur:l,1g tl1e 19 30 's and modest gains 
were recorded in agriculture. However, tl,e outbreak of 'i!orld War II 
slowed down the rate of progress e.ven though ':i'.1.!rkey did not actively 
get involved in the Har. During the years follo,;•,ing the Har, and par­
ticularly after a change in government ir- 1950, the overall strategy 
towards economic development was altered \-;ith an in.creasing emphasis on 
the private sector. Since 1960 government efforts in the economic field 
have been better coordinated through the implementation of five-year 
development plans. 
The changes in the socio-economic milieu since 1945 can be followed 
through the information given in Table B-1, The table shows Turkey 
averages for all the variables used in this study as well as information 
on population changes and the structure of the economy. The Turkish 
per capita income increased from U.S. dollars 132.1 in 1945 to 240.7 
in 1965 in 1961 prices, indicating an annua::. rate of economic growth of 
3 per cent. There was also a noti-:::eable change in the conposition of 
- 66 -
output during these yearso The share of agriculture in the to
tal declined 
from about 56 per cent in 1945 to 42 per cent in 1965, while the shar
e 
of services increased at a more rapid pace than did that of in
dustry. 
Meanwhile the population increased fron nineteen million in 19
45 to 
The annual rate of population crowthabout thirty-one million in 1965. 
was approxir:lately 2c6 per cent during these twenty years. 
The literacy level has continued to increase. Despite the eff
orts 
made by the governments in the previous twenty years, the crud
e liter­
acy rate was still as low as 25 per cent in 1945, By 1965 it had r
isen 
to 42 per cent, Beginning frou :::,, very low base, the increase 
in the 
literacy level of the female population was more impressive as
 compared 
with that of th3 male population: the fen;a
1_e literacy rate doubled 
between 1945 and 1965c 
The industrial compoeition of the labor force has changed 




iJhil:c; in 1950 nearly three-fourths of the total 
male labor force was engagec in a3riculture, the ratio dropped by 
}Ieanwhile) the urbanizationabout ten percentage po:ints by 1965. 
process seems to have gained momentum~ particularly since 1950
. For 
example, the percentage of those living in urban settlements w
ith 
population of 5 ~000 and ove:-:- jumped fron. 22 per cent in 1950 t
o 32 per cent 
1An apparent ir.crease in the male agricultural labor force betw
een 
1945 and 1950 needs interpretation.. In 1945 Turkey had a larger army 
than in 1950.. Since the- age distribution of the labor force i
s biased 
towards agr:t'_cultu1:e in yom1ger age 0roups ~ proportionately mor
e people 
were under ams from ~h," agYicultura}. sector. This is evidenc
ed by the 
sharp increase reported in the agricultural labor force in age
 group 
20-24 in 1950 in later census ye~rs" 
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Table B-1 
SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOHIC INDICATORS, TURKEY 1945-65 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 
LITERACY LEVEL 
HLIT 34.97 38.52 44.79 46.87 52.34 
FLIT 13.70 16.55 20.59 22.56 26. 85 
Total 24. 39 2 7.59 32. 89 34.93 39.84 
INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION 
Ol!' HALE LABOR FORCE 
AGR 71.45 73< 72 70.68 66. 77 64.29 
Il'ID 15.29 14. 75 17.10 19.25 21.27 
Services 13.25 11.53 12.22 13.98 14.44 
FEMALE LABOR FORCE 
RFLF 2.25 2, 81 2. 76 3.00 (1) 
URBANIZATION 
URB 02 24.23 24.67 28.18 31.41 34.21 
URB 05 21.40 21.99 25.67 28. 82 31.58 
URB 10 18.41 18. 76 22 .15 25.22 28.41 
URB 20 14.04 14.90 18.11 21. 76 24.98 
URB 50 7.70 9,61 12.88 16.13 18.42 
MARITAL RATES 
RHART 64.85 6 7 .oo 71.23 73.81 70.29 
PER CAPITA GNP ,2 1(in U.S. dollars)( 132.1 156.6 183.0 213.4 240. 7 
C01'1POSITIO~) OF GNP 
(percent) ( 
AGR 55.93 50.30 45.43 43.93 41.86 
IND 15.50 15.90 17 .27 16.50 17.40 
Services 28.57 33.80 37.30 39.57 40. 74 
MIDYEAR POPULATION 
Total (in thousands) 18,929 20,809 23,859 27,509 31,151 
Annual intercensal 
Percent increase 1.06 2.17 2.78 2. 85 2.46 
(1) Considerable discrepancy in reporting of female participation in 
non-agricultural labor activity was observed in the 1965 census 
year. Since the 1965 observations on independent variables are 
not used in the present study, 1965 RFLF is not re-estimated. 
(2) Three years' average centering around the year indicated. 
Hote: For definition of varic;.bles, see Tabie 3. 
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in 1965. Larger size cities also gained similar population increases. 
Turkish governments maintained a pro-natalistic policy until the 
1960's. Turkey emerged from the Horld War I with significant loses 
in population and a war-torn economy. The leaders felt the need for a 
large population mainly for military and political reasons. However, 
the general attitude has gradually changed and a new population policy 
emphasizing the need for family planning programs was adopted in 1965. 
It is against this background that the changes in provincial fer­
tility in Turkey should be evaluated, 
